

Determinism:

Just As Lucky and Even More Alienating¹

This paper defends incompatibilism from two distinct luck-related challenges: first, that an indeterminism such as the one required by libertarians brings about chanciness or luck in how we act, and thus, far from being *necessary* for free will, would seem to *undermine* rational control; and second, that indeterminism brings about luck or chanciness in how we act, and thus cannot possibly *enhance* or *increase* our control over our actions, with respect to the control we can have in a deterministic world. In Section 1, I argue that a suitable indeterminism would not undermine our rational control over our behavior, because it would not make any of our actions luckier or more chancy than they would be if the world were deterministic. In Section 2, I argue that a suitable indeterminism would actually *enhance* or *increase* our agential control, because determinism entails a proposition about our causal significance as agents which is *alienating*. Both of my arguments rely on the thesis that, if any of our actions are free, some of our free actions are performed in a genuinely *split* state of mind, and with relevant dispositions to do otherwise in the circumstance. Despite defending incompatibilism against these attacks, I am not an incompatibilist, because it does not seem clear to me that the kind of *control-enhancement* that a suitable indeterminism would bring would make the difference between having and lacking moral responsibility.

1. Cross-World Luck Is a Problem for Compatibilists as Well²

¹ Thanks to Stephen Kearns for interesting and helpful discussions on the two main arguments in this paper, and for great suggestions on how to present the second argument.

² I offer an extended version of this argument in my (2014).

Alfred Mele puts forward what he sees as “a serious problem luck poses for libertarians” (2006, 6): that the kind of indeterminism required for free will by libertarians brings about what he calls *present luck*, i.e., luck about the fact that one decides and subsequently acts as one does rather than in some other way that one was, at the time, causally able to decide and act. I will argue that *cross-world luck at the time of decision*³ - luck about the fact that one decides as one does rather than otherwise - is a problem for compatibilists as well. I grant that decisions which are undetermined in the way required by standard libertarians are lucky in the way Mele describes. What I argue is that the relevant decisions are *not* lucky *because they are undetermined*. They are lucky because they are made by an agent who is motivationally *split* and has certain specific dispositions to deliberate and decide in given ways in the circumstance. When indeterministic agents are subject to cross-world luck at the time of decision, their deterministic counterparts are too. If a *split* decision of the relevant kind is performed in a deterministic world, the agent is just as lucky that she decides as she does rather than otherwise, because this contrastive fact cannot be explained by any suitable combination of mental causes of the decision. Hence, Mele’s luck problem is a problem for libertarians and compatibilists alike.

Present luck is a *prima facie* challenge to any libertarian account which says that, if an agent is motivationally divided between various incompatible options, her decision is free only if she is causally able, up to the moment of decision, to refrain from deciding as she does. This is one of the cases Mele offers (73-4): Bob agreed to toss a coin at noon to begin a football game. But Carl bet that today’s starting coin will not be tossed until 12:02, and he offered Bob \$50 to wait until 12:02 to toss it. Bob doesn’t know what to do: he wants the money, but has moral reasons against helping Carl cheat other gamblers. After some reflection, Bob judges that, all things considered, he should toss the coin at noon. However, at noon, he decides to wait until 12:02 to toss it. This decision

³ On Mele’s construal, present luck requires indeterminism by definition (see, for instance, 7-9). I use ‘cross-world luck’, which is often used as a synonym of ‘present luck’, to encompass both present luck and what I regard as its deterministic counterpart.

occurs at a time at which the past and the laws of nature are consistent with Bob's not deciding to wait until 12:02; in particular, in a possible world which is exactly the same as the actual world up to noon, Bob decides at noon to toss the coin straightaway, and does this. Thus, at noon, two opposing decisions are nomologically possible: the decision to help Carl cheat, and the decision to do the right thing.

What is just a matter of luck, according to Mele, is “the difference at the time of choice or decision between the actual world and any world in which he instead decides in favor of another live option” (74). What Mele calls “the problem of present luck” (66) is that whether Bob decides to do the right thing or the wrong thing seems to be just a matter of chance, and hence - given the decisions’s significance for Bob - just a matter of luck for Bob, because the causal antecedents of both decisions are exactly the same, and hence nothing in the causal antecedents of his actual decision makes it the case that he decides to wait *rather than* deciding to toss the coin then. After all Bob did (indeed, after all that happened) up to noon, each alternative decision was compatible with the past and the laws, and it was mere chance that Bob decided one way rather than the other way. And, if Bob decided to do something *prima facie* blameworthy instead of something *prima facie* praiseworthy out of mere bad luck, it seems inappropriate, Mele says, to blame him for deciding as he did. Given that the best explanation for his lack of responsibility, if he is indeed not responsible, is his lack of freedom, the fact that it seems inappropriate to blame John for his decision indicates, to Mele, that his decision was not free, and hence that his ensuing action was not free either (see 8 and 60).

I concede that decisions which are undetermined in the way standard libertarians require are subject to present luck. But I claim that it’s not because they are undetermined that they are lucky; these decisions would be just as lucky if they were performed in a deterministic world. A decision performed at a time at which the agent is psychologically disposed (and suitably skilled and placed) to refrain from deciding that way in the circumstance is subject to cross-world luck, whether the

world is deterministic or indeterministic. Bob, in particular, is lucky that he decides as he does rather than otherwise because, in a nearby possible world where the salient causes and background conditions which are relevant to his deciding one way or another in the circumstance are the same (including his reasons, his character traits and even his way of deliberating), he decides otherwise instead. If we make Bob's world deterministic, we don't thereby eliminate the nearby possible worlds where Bob's counterpart does otherwise in conditions which don't significantly differ from Bob's. (Though, of course, since the worlds at issue are deterministic, either the past or the laws must differ in some way to produce different outcomes.)

Consider again Bob's decision to cheat by waiting until 12:02 to toss the coin. Take Bob's counterpart, Bob*, who lives in a deterministic world. The events in Bob*'s deliberative process, his decision to cheat, and also his dispositions to deliberate and decide in various ways in the circumstance are the same as in Bob's case. Like Bob, Bob* is, up to noon, psychologically disposed to decide to do the right thing (for the same reasons which motivate Bob). Neither his deliberating as he does nor his deciding to cheat reflect an unequivocal commitment to cheating over doing the right thing, or a psychological incapacity to resist the temptation for the money, or the like. Both Bob and Bob* are, at noon, normally motivated and disposed to decide either way in the circumstance, and in possession of the skills and opportunities required to decide either way.

Thus, it seems clear that the fact that Bob*'s decision to wait until 12:02 is determined is *not* grounded in the attitudes, tendencies, skills and features of the circumstance which are relevant to what he is motivated and disposed to do in the circumstance. Indeed, why should these render Bob* causally determined to decide to cheat, instead of causally determined to decide to toss the coin at noon? There are deterministic worlds which don't diverge from Bob*'s world in any of these respects until noon, and in which Bob*'s counterpart decides at noon to toss the coin straightaway and does this. But, while one and the same set of relevant causal factors may causally *ground* mutually exclusive outcomes, it may not causally *determine* mutually exclusive outcomes. Hence,

Bob*'s relevant motivations, skills and opportunities cannot both causally determine that Bob* will decide to wait and causally determine that he will decide to toss the coin at noon. Therefore, these motivations, skills and opportunities do not causally determine (together with action-enabling background conditions) that Bob* decides to wait (in some way or another, at some specific time or other), nor do they explain that he decides to wait *instead of deciding to toss the coin*.

The truth of determinism does not make it true that, if Bob* had not decided to cheat in the way he did, he would have decided to cheat in some other way, but would in no case have decided to do the right thing with those reasons in that circumstance. This counterfactual is false of Bob*, just as it's false of Bob (his indeterministic counterpart). If an agent is unequivocally motivated to cheat (which, by hypothesis, Bob and Bob* aren't), the nearest possible world where she voluntarily refrains from cheating is one where something significant in her relevant reasons or capacities is different. In contrast, the nearest possible world where Bob* voluntarily refrains from cheating is one where nothing significant changes in his relevant motivations and condition, and he refrains for the moral reasons for which he was about to refrain when he decided to cheat.

To see this, consider an action whose freedom is not in question. The first time Bob* goes golfing, on a very rainy day, and luckily holes a difficult putt, his poor golfing skills and the course conditions (together with his attempt to hole the putt and the action-enabling background conditions) are *not* what determines that he holes the putt. Even though he is determined to hole the putt (this event is determined to happen since billions of years ago), he is really lucky to do so. His poor skills, his merely acceptable physical condition, the rain and the strong wind, far from determining or guaranteeing that he will succeed in sinking the putt rather than failing, make it very unlikely (in some sense which doesn't imply the falsity of determinism) that an event of this type will happen. (In nearby possible worlds where he tries to sink the putt in the relevant conditions, he fails.) He is determined to hole the putt only because his world is deterministic, as opposed to a

skilled golfer in optimal conditions who is determined to hole an easy putt whether or not her world is deterministic.

I am assuming that, if the world is deterministic, when amateur golfers luckily sink putts, they do not exhibit a power to guarantee that they will sink a putt in those conditions, and when non-alcoholics drink beers because they desire to do so more strongly than they desire to do anything else then, they do not exhibit a compulsion for alcohol, and they are not determined to drink in virtue of, say, their desire for a beer and a lack of obstacles to their drinking a beer (even though these factors do cause their drinking and the drinking is determined). The kind of action determination that may signify great golfing skills and perfect conditions is *not* the action determination that affects every single action in a deterministic world, but a kind possible both in deterministic and indeterministic worlds. Whether or not the world is deterministic, some skilled golfers and alcoholics and priests are determined to sink putts and drink beers and burn papal bulls in given circumstances (in some specific way or other), in that, if they didn't do these things in one way, they would do them in another, holding fixed their relevant attitudes, tendencies, skills, opportunities, and other relevant features of their circumstance. To avoid confusion, when I speak of this kind of determination I will say that an agent is *drawn* to A-ing in C: An agent is *drawn* to A-ing in C when she is causally determined to A during a certain time span in such a way that, if she does not A in one way, she will A in some other way. One may be drawn to A-ing during a given time span without it being causally determined which particular actions one will perform during that interval. And one may be causally determined to A because the world is deterministic, without being drawn to A-ing. The truth of determinism is neither necessary nor sufficient to make agents drawn to performing all their actions.

Let's suppose that, whether or not the world is deterministic, some great golfers are, sometimes, drawn to holing certain putts. What explains that one of these golfers is causally determined to hole a given putt on one of these occasions is, let's suppose, that she is very skilled

and the relevant conditions are friendly. In contrast, what explains that a lucky golfer is causally determined to hole a difficult putt is the very same fact which renders him causally determined to hole the putt in the perfectly specific way in which he does - namely, a huge set of past states and events and laws of nature, and not the salient causes of the lucky success. What contrastively explains the lucky golfer's succeeding instead of failing are things like a lucky slip of the foot and the wind blowing at just the right moment; these things don't happen in the nearby possible worlds where he tries to sink that putt in those conditions, and this means the success is lucky.

It's true that, unlike in Bob's indeterministic world, there is in Bob*'s deterministic world a contrastive explanation for his deciding as he does rather than otherwise: the laws of nature and the whole history of Bob*'s world, up to the moment he decides to cheat, are compatible only with that decision to cheat (indeed, with that very one, down to all its microphysical details). Similarly, there is a contrastive explanation for Bob*'s fortunate counterpart's decision *not* to cheat instead of deciding otherwise: the whole history of the world up to that instant plus the laws of nature are compatible only with his deciding not to cheat, exactly as he does. But I cannot see what good it does to Bob* and to his fortunate counterpart, regarding the freedom or the rational control they have, that there is a contrastive explanation of their decisions, since these contrastive explanations do not feature significant mental causes which distinctively rationalize, or even saliently cause, their deciding as they do rather than otherwise.

Given these modal facts concerning Bob's and Bob*'s decisions, Bob* is just as unlucky as Bob is about the fact that he decides to cheat instead of deciding to refrain from cheating. Therefore, Bob's decision is chancy or lucky not because it is undetermined, but because Bob is psychologically disposed to decide differently without deliberating in a substantially different way, holding fixed his relevant attitudes, tendencies, capacities and circumstance. Even though Bob* is not subject to what Mele calls *present luck* (which requires indeterminism by definition), he is subject to cross-world luck at the time of decision, since his deciding to cheat instead of deciding

not to be chancy, and the fact that he makes the decision he makes is significant - in this case bad - for him. Determinism would not eliminate Bob's luck regarding the fact that he did the wrong thing rather than the right thing, and analogous conclusions are true of the rest of split decisions which must be undetermined to be free according to libertarians. Therefore, the indeterminism required by libertarians does not bring about cross-world luck at the time of decision, and hence this kind of luck is not a problem for libertarians only; it is also a problem for compatibilists who want to leave room for the possibility of free action in cases where agents are genuinely motivationally divided between several options.

2. The Truth of Determinism Would Be Alienating

This section considers an argument against libertarianism which is closely related to Mele's problem of present luck. The key premise in both cases is that, since nothing the indeterministic agent does in deliberation makes it the case that she decides and acts as she does *rather than* in any of the alternative ways that were causally open to her until she decided, the indeterministic agent decides as she does *rather than otherwise* out of mere chance or luck. One may, like Mele, take this to suggest that indeterminism would seem to *undermine*, or even *preclude*, the rational control over behavior that is key to acting freely.

Alternatively, one may take this to suggest that indeterminism *could not possibly enhance* or *increase* our rational control over our behavior. In my view, this second criticism to libertarianism is more difficult to answer than the first one. Libertarians claim that indeterminism is not only *compatible with*, but *required for* free will, and hence that indeterminism either makes rational control possible, or enhances rational control significantly enough to make moral responsibility possible. But the decisions which, according to libertarians, must be undetermined to be free are all subject to cross-world luck. And, if all the abilities that we have only if libertarianism is true are abilities to *chancily* choose B-ing over A-ing, it's not clear how having these abilities *enhances* our

control over our choices with respect to the control we can have in a deterministic world. (For a similar point, see Clarke 2003, Chap. 6.) This is, I grant, a luck problem for libertarians only. But, despite the force of this problem, I believe that a suitable indeterminism *would* enhance our agential control; determinism would, in some sense I find difficult to clarify, *undermine* this control, or make it *shallower*, since determinism's truth would be *alienating*.

My discussion in Section 1 placed considerable weight on the thesis that, if we ever act freely, sometimes we act freely in a genuinely divided state of mind. In other words, there are two kinds of prima facie free intentional action,⁴ which I call *Luther-type* and *split actions*, and correspondingly two kinds of case, which I call *Luther-type* and *split cases*. This is how I construe Luther-type actions:

An intentional A-ing performed by S in circumstance C is a *Luther-type action* if and only if, holding fixed the attitudes and tendencies which are relevant to what types of action S is psychologically disposed to intentionally perform in C, S is *not* psychologically disposed to intentionally perform, in C, any action that she takes to be incompatible with A-ing in C.

An instance of a Luther-type action was, let's suppose, Luther's publicly burning the edict where the Pope demanded him to recant, on the morning of the 10th of December of 1520 in Wittenberg. This was, let's imagine, Luther's only live option, the only thing he was at least minimally motivated to do given his assessment of the situation. Nothing motivated him to refrain from challenging the Catholic Church as he did, by publicly burning the papal bull at that place and time; all his relevant beliefs, desires and tendencies unequivocally pointed to doing what he did - say, *burning the papal bull in Wittenberg on the morning of the 10th of December of 1520*. He had no unconscious desires to be corrupt or live an easy life, no conscious temptations, and no habits

⁴ I am including decisions here, which I regard as intentional actions.

which might have led him to postpone his fight. He was not afraid, and he had no doubts about his final purposes, nor about whether his actions were necessary or the best way to attain his purposes. In consequence, he was not psychologically disposed to perform, given the relevant aspects of his circumstance (for instance, given that he didn't have reason to think that innocents would be tortured if he burned the edict, etc.), any action that he took to be incompatible with burning the edict.

Note that not all Luther-type actions are performed because of what the agent takes to be overwhelmingly good reason to act. Compulsions, phobias, and similar factors may constrain the agent's live options to one, just as effectively as a better judgment of which a perfectly self-controlled agent feels certain. It's not even the case that, in all Luther-type cases, agents are strongly pulled by some intensely felt desire to act as they do, nor rendered psychologically unable to do otherwise by some strong commitment, or by some unbreakable loyalty. Some very habitual actions performed without having reason to skip one's routine may be Luther-type actions too. For instance, it's plausible that, on many occasions on which I unlock my house door, I am not in the least disposed to do otherwise instead without first losing or acquiring some relatively significant reason to act.

Actions which are not Luther-type are *split actions*:

An intentional A-ing performed by S in circumstance C is a *split action* if and only if, holding fixed the attitudes and tendencies which are relevant to what types of action S is psychologically disposed to intentionally perform in C, S is psychologically disposed not only to A in C, but also (alternatively) to perform, in C, other actions that she takes to be incompatible with A-ing in C.

In split cases, we have reasons to act in either one of various mutually incompatible ways in the circumstance. Take, for instance, insubstantial actions like ordering one within a set of dishes you are considering, or whimsical actions like getting off the bus two stops before because you don't feel like being in a crowded bus any longer, or difficult actions performed when you are strongly motivated to do otherwise, like telling a friend at the start of a much needed vacation together that she will be fired from her job. Split actions include akratic actions, but they aren't exhausted by akratic actions, nor by akratic and continent actions, simply because not all split actions are performed when the agent has a judgment about what to do all things considered. Introspection and observation tell me that most of our actions are split actions. For instance, extremely disciplined and extremely unrestrained actions may be Luther-type actions (given certain facts about the agents in question in the relevant circumstances), but most disciplined actions are performed with *some* motivation to do other than discipline requires, and most unrestrained actions are performed with *some* motivation to restrain oneself, not necessarily after losing or acquiring some relevant reason.

For reasons I explained, I believe that, while the relative strength of Luther's desire to, say, burn the papal bull at a certain place on a certain morning, together with his having the required skills and opportunity, can account for his being causally determined to burn the edict, the relative strength of my desire to go get a glass of water within the next few minutes (together with my having the required skills and opportunity) cannot account for my being causally determined to go get a glass of water. This is because, while Luther was not psychologically disposed to refrain from burning the papal bull that day, I was disposed to continue writing without taking a water break. In short, Luther was drawn to burning the papal bull that morning, because his case was a Luther-type case and he had the required skills and opportunities. But I wasn't drawn to taking a water break before dinner, since my case was a split case.

I believe that determinism would be *alienating* because, if the world is deterministic, in split cases in which you have the required skills and opportunities to perform any one of your live options (let's call them *favorable* split cases), it's arbitrary with respect to your motivations, skills and opportunities, both that you are causally able to perform only one action type in the circumstance, and that this action type is, say, A-ing rather than B-ing or C-ing (where A-ing, B-ing and C-ing are your live options). In contrast, if the world is suitably indeterministic, in favorable split cases, what types of action are causally open to you is set by what types of action you are suitably motivated to perform in the circumstance *and by nothing else which competes with this*.

I grant that, also if the world is deterministic, what we are causally able to do depends on our motivations to act in given ways in the circumstances. It's not that, if the world is deterministic, what we do is unrelated to what we are motivated to do; what we do is usually one of the things we were motivated to do, and this means that we usually retain a certain control over our behavior, sufficient to act intentionally. But, if the world is deterministic, I think there is a sense in which the laws *compete* with our motivations and skills in setting what we are causally able to do at each point in time. Only in a suitably indeterministic world are we, whenever we act in a favorable split case, causally able to choose either of our live options. If the world is deterministic, even in favorable split cases, we are causally able to perform, at each point in time, only one type of action, such as taking a water break or burning a papal bull. Thus, I believe that, in a sense, if the world is deterministic, what types of action are causally open to us when we act in a favorable split case is *not* set by what types of action we are suitably motivated to perform *and by nothing else which competes with this*. Nomological necessities at the microphysical level *compete*, in some sense, with our motivations, skills and opportunities, since physical laws narrow down our causally available courses of action in a way that is arbitrary with respect to our motivations, skills and opportunities. (The competition isn't analogous to how competing causal factors, such as hunger and nausea, compete to bring about what each tends to bring about.) I think this makes determinism *alienating*

in some sense, even though all-encompassing deterministic laws don't constrain our causally available courses of action like powerful puppet masters do, nor like prisons and compulsions do.

Presumably, your control over a bit of behavior is linked to the fact that what types of action you can⁵ perform, holding fixed relevant facts about you in your present condition, depends on your relevant beliefs, desires, values, preferences, and so on. Even though, if the world is deterministic, what types of action you can perform in the circumstance, in an important sense of 'can', depends on your motivations (for instance, I could have taken a water break earlier even if the world is deterministic), it is hard to shake off the thought that what does the real work in setting what you are *causally* able to do at each point is quite oblivious to your motivations, skills, and opportunities at the time.

This is my argument for the conclusion that the truth of determinism would be alienating:

1. If the world is suitably indeterministic, in favorable cases, what types of deliberation, decision and overt action are causally open to you is set (in part) by your relevant attitudes and tendencies, *and by nothing else which competes with these*.

2. If the world is deterministic, even in favorable cases, microphysical laws *compete*, in some sense, with your causally relevant motivations, skills and opportunities, in narrowing down what types of deliberation, decision and overt action are causally open to you. (Talk of competition is warranted because the narrowing down is arbitrary with respect to your motivations, skills and opportunities.)

3. A world where, in cases where you act voluntarily free from compulsions and constraints, nothing *competes* with your relevant attitudes and tendencies in setting what types of

⁵ I leave this 'can' unspecified because what sense of 'can' matters here is controversial.

deliberation, decision and overt action are causally open to you is less *alienating* than one where what is causally open is narrowed down in a way that's arbitrary with respect to your relevant motivations, skills and opportunities.

4. Therefore, a suitably indeterministic world is less *alienating* than a deterministic world.

In other words, I believe that, if the world is suitably indeterministic, there is a sense in which voluntary behavior depends more heavily on your will - and, more generally, there is a sense in which events depend more heavily on their salient causes: if you are suitably motivated only to A, only A-ing is causally open to you, while if you are suitably motivated to either A or B, both actions are causally open to you (again, in favorable cases, where you have all the required skills and opportunities). In contrast, if the world is deterministic, whether you are suitably motivated (and skilled, and so on) to perform one type of action or many mutually incompatible types, you are always causally able to perform only one type of action; and which type of action this is, in most split cases, is arbitrary with respect to your relevant attitudes, tendencies, capacities and circumstance. My claim is that this makes a deterministic world more *alienating* than a suitably indeterministic one.

A key assumption I am making is that there is a legitimate sense in which we can say that events have the salient causes that they have, and these causes have the relative strengths they have (with respect to each other and with respect to competing factors they defeat - i.e., factors which, if causally effective, would have caused incompatible outcomes), independently of whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic. This is why, independently of whether or not the world is deterministic, we can legitimately say that some cancer patients are doomed and others are not, some putt makings are guaranteed and others lucky, and some alcohol drinkings are compulsive and others aren't. The type of determination that doomed deaths, infallible putt makings, and

compulsive drinkings share is grounded in the salient causes of the determined event, and what these salient causes determine is that some event of a given generic type will happen within a given time and space. Whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic, some events are determined in this way - drawn to happening - and some aren't. In particular, whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic, agents sometimes are and sometimes aren't drawn to doing things.⁶

In a deterministic world, let's assume, the state of the world at any given time is compatible, given the laws, with exactly one next state, microphysically individuated. But this does not mean that, for any event, what I am calling the *salient causes* of the event (causes of kinds we invoke in our everyday causal explanations, such as reasons, facts about agents' conditions, etc.) are compatible, given the laws, with an event of that general type only - say, with a water drinking, or wine drinking, or computer breakdown, or window breaking. If the world is deterministic, many events which were very unlikely given their salient causes alone (take a lottery winning, or the luckiest free throw made by an amateur) were nonetheless determined to happen since billions of years before.

Whether or not the world is deterministic, in most cases the salient causes of an event don't make it the case that, had not that particular event happened, some other event of the same general type (a computer breakdown, a water drinking) would have happened instead. For instance, if I'm not an alcoholic and I'm torn between having another glass of wine or switching to water instead, my reasons to have another glass of wine, together with my skills and opportunity to do so, do *not* determine that I will have wine instead of water - that is, they do not make it the case that, if I do

⁶ Importantly, the argument in this paper assumes what Driver (2013) calls the *modal view* of luck, namely the view that "luck is not simply epistemic but instead corresponds to flukes – occurrences of this world that fail to be occurrences in the relevant set of nearby possible worlds" (12). The main alternative to this view is what Driver calls *epistemic reductionism* about luck, the view that "luck simply reflects a state of ignorance on the part of either the luck attributor or the 'lucky' individual" (12). On this view, in a deterministic world, nothing is really chancy, unlikely or lucky (everything is inevitable), and it is because we are ignorant of relevant facts that some events appear chancy, unlikely and lucky (12–14).

not order and drink the wine in a certain way, I will do so in some other slightly different way, within a given span of time. With respect to what I am motivated to do in the circumstance (and more generally with respect to the salient causes of my action), it is arbitrary that I am determined to drink one more wine, instead of being determined to do something else that I am also significantly motivated to do and for which I also have the necessary skills and opportunity, such as switching to water. In contrast, if, besides having the skills and opportunity required to have one more wine, I am a willing alcoholic, my motivations, skills and opportunities, together with action-enabling background conditions, *do* make it the case that, if I do not order and drink the wine in a certain way, I will do so in some other slightly different way. In this sense, these causal factors and the relevant background conditions *do* determine that I will drink one more wine tonight: they make me drawn to drinking one more wine tonight.

As to Luther-type cases, I grant that exhibiting perfect rational control in these cases requires a suitable kind of action determination (it requires being suitably drawn to acting in a certain way). But this action determination is independent from the truth of determinism. If the world is deterministic, favorable Luther-type cases feature two kinds of event-determination: as happens in split cases if the world is deterministic, the distant past and the laws of nature determine the occurrence of a particular event, microphysically individuated; and, unlike what happens in split cases whether or not the world is deterministic, salient causes and conditions render you drawn to A-ing. But these are two independent kinds of determination: what is nomologically necessary is a particular A-ing in all its details, while the salient causes determine only that you will A in some way or other. The truth of determinism is neither necessary nor sufficient for this second kind of action determination, which is the kind of determination that is key to *antecedent determining*

control.⁷ Relatedly, bear in mind that people are not motivated to perform perfectly specific actions, but to perform actions of given types in given circumstances. That is, my drinking water as I intend to would be equally realized by different chains of physical states and events, since I could not care, for instance, about differences between similar perfectly specific limb movements. Therefore, even in Luther-type cases, where perfect control requires antecedent determining control, being determined to act *in a perfectly specific* way could not enhance one's control with respect to a suitably indeterministic world. The truth of determinism neither makes possible nor enhances any kind of agential control, even in Luther-type cases.

I have been speaking as if it were obvious that the *alienation* determinism would bring would signify a decrease in our *control* over our behavior. Isn't all agential control set by what I've been calling *salient* causes and conditions, which are what they are on each occasion independently of whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic? I don't know how to answer this question. The reason why I claim that determinism would decrease our *control* over our behavior is simply that alienation seems to be a partial lack of control, even though it does not threaten direct control over intentional behavior like external constraints and compulsions do. Note that the same seems to be true of heteronomy. Consider an agent who is not autonomous with respect to her religious beliefs and central values because these were brainwashed into her. This heteronomy seems to consist in the agent's having less (indirect) *control* over her relevant beliefs and values than autonomous agents have over their religious beliefs and values. However, brainwashing does not decrease the agent's direct control over her intentional behavior: the brainwashed agent need not act compulsively, for instance; in fact, she may exercise antecedent determining control over perfectly self-controlled Luther-type actions, just like an autonomous agent may (cf. Mele 1995, Chaps. 7-8).

⁷ Robert Kane defines what he calls *antecedent determining control* as "the ability to be in, or bring about, conditions such that one can guarantee or determine which of a set of outcomes is going to occur before it occurs, whether the outcomes are one's own actions, the actions of others, or events in the world generally" (1996, 144).

(In case this analogy is misleading, I should clarify that I accept that the difference between manipulation and a lack of manipulation has to do with a difference in what I'm calling *salient* causes and conditions - not salient causes *of actions*, but salient causes and conditions in the process by which agents acquire, change and lose attitudes and tendencies.)

Would the decrease in control that alienation would suppose be a decrease in *rational* control? I'm inclined to think it would not. Whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic, the salient causes of our actions are what they are; and, on the view I accept, rational control is a matter of intentional behavior suitably causally depending on salient mental causes, in a way that's compatible with both the truth and the falsity of determinism. Compare Sarah's using heroin for the first time and John's using heroin once more, after months of regular use. Sarah's action isn't compulsive, while John's is. There is a spectrum of degrees of rational control over an intentional action, which goes from Sarah's action (which meets, let's suppose, all standard compatibilist conditions) to a completely compulsive action of John's. This spectrum of degrees is grounded on a spectrum of degrees to which the agent guides her action independently of her rational evaluation of the alternatives. Like most incompatibilists, I grant that what point on this spectrum an action is on is independent from whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic. My claim is not that determinism would decrease rational control in the way addictions do, or in the way puppet masters do.

3. Concluding Remarks

This paper considered two compelling challenges to libertarianism. Both contend that the indeterminism libertarians require is a *prima facie* threat to free will, because it brings about a chanciness that's absent in a deterministic world. The first challenge says that the luck brought about by indeterminism seems to *undermine* the rational control required for moral responsibility. I argued in Section 1 that the relevant indeterminism would not bring about luck or chanciness in

how we act. Cross-world luck at the time of decision is inherent to certain decisions, and independent of whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic. I concluded that cross-world luck at the time of decision is a problem for any account, compatibilist or incompatibilist, which wants to leave room for the possibility of free action in cases where agents are psychologically disposed to decide differently without deliberating in a substantially different way.

The second luck-related problem for incompatibilism, which I considered in Section 2, has to do with the fact that, for incompatibilism to be true (while free will is possible), indeterminism must increase or enhance control - and do this significantly enough to make the difference between having and lacking moral responsibility. But, for all libertarians require, all of the actions which must be undetermined to be free are subject to cross-world luck. And if all the abilities that we have only if libertarianism is true are abilities to *chancily* choose one live option over another, it seems that having these abilities could not possibly *enhance* our control over our behavior with respect to the control we would have if we met the compatibilist's sufficient conditions for free will. I granted that this is a luck problem for libertarians only, but I argued that a suitable indeterminism *would* signify some kind of *enhancement* in our control over our actions, with respect to the control we could have if the world were deterministic. Determinism would signify a kind of *impoverishment* of our control over our intentional behavior, because it would have the *alienating* implication that our motivations and capacities would be less causally relevant than in a suitably indeterministic world, in some sense of 'causally relevant' which isn't analogous to how partial causes are causally relevant with respect to alternative outcomes.

But is this alienation sufficient reason to think that determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility? I don't know how to answer this question. What salient causes actions have is independent from whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic, and the distinctions that we ordinarily take into account when we blame and exempt from blame have to do with the salient causes of actions. I claim that, in split cases, it would be alienating to be determined

to choose one live option in particular. (And, in Luther-type cases, it would be alienating to be determined to perform a perfectly specific chain of basic actions and so on.) But I am not committed to the thesis that determinism would thereby decrease control sufficiently to undermine moral responsibility, since this alienation is not *clearly* relevant to legitimate moral responsibility ascriptions. The world's being deterministic or indeterministic does not affect which of our actions are brave, difficult, callous, whimsical, or continent, nor which of our actions are antecedently determined, unequivocally desired, compulsive, or lucky, and to which degree. And it is features like these of control over intentional behavior that are *most directly and clearly* relevant to moral responsibility.

Thus, even though determinism would, I think, undermine control or make it shallower, it might still leave room for an amount of control that is sufficient for moral responsibility. Since I don't have an argument that this alienation would preclude moral responsibility, I don't have a response to the second luck problem for libertarians, and hence I'm not an incompatibilist. However, I do think that, contrarily to what compatibilists often claim, it makes sense to care about whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic, and that people's sense of alienation when they imagine that the world is deterministic need not result from misunderstanding the way in which actions would be caused if the world were deterministic. In particular, when philosophers judge that determinism would undermine control, this judgment is not, at least typically, the result of confusing causation with compulsion, nor of imagining the Universe, or the laws, as evil puppet-masters who constrain our thoughts and actions.

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